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Abstract
Differential privacy mechanisms that also make
reconstruction of the data impossible come at a
cost - a decrease in utility. In this paper, we
tackle this problem by designing a private data
release mechanism that makes reconstruction of
the original data impossible and also preserves
utility for a wide range of machine learning al-
gorithms. We do so by combining the Johnson-
Lindenstrauss (JL) transform with noise gener-
ated from a Laplace distribution. While the JL
transform can itself provide privacy guarantees
(Blocki et al., 2012) and make reconstruction im-
possible, we do not rely on its differential privacy
properties and only utilize its ability to make
reconstruction impossible. We present novel
proofs to show that our mechanism is differen-
tially private under single element changes as
well as single row changes to any database. In or-
der to show utility, we prove that our mechanism
maintains pairwise distances between points in
expectation and also show that its variance is pro-
portional to the dimensionality of the subspace
we project the data into. Finally, we experimen-
tally show the utility of our mechanism by de-
ploying it on the task of clustering.
1. Introduction
While the recent surge in data available for machine learn-
ing has created new opportunities, it also poses a risk to the
privacy of individuals. Differential privacy (Dwork et al.,
2006) is the most widely accepted framework that attempts
to address this issue by capturing precisely how much addi-
tional information of an individual is leaked by participat-
ing in a database that would not have been leaked otherwise.
Consequently, by providing guarantees within the frame-
work of differential privacy, one can protect the privacy of
the individuals participating in a database while utilizing
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the private data to build machine learning models.
However, differentially private releases of aggregate statis-
tics have been shown to be susceptible to reconstruction
and tracing attacks (Dwork et al., 2017) under certain con-
straints. This is also true in the non-interactive setting
where the amount of noise added to the data must be in-
creased drastically in order to make reconstruction difficult
(Bhowmick et al., 2018; Dwork et al., 2014). Even differ-
entially private machine learning models have been shown
to be susceptible to membership inference attacks that leak
information about individual participation (Rahman et al.;
Shokri et al., 2017). The above issues create the need for
stronger privacy mechanisms that make it provably impos-
sible for an adversary to reconstruct the original data, hence
eliminating concerns about privacy. However, mechanisms
that do so, achieve this goal at the cost of a significant
drop in utility (Blocki et al., 2012). One approach to im-
prove this utility has been to design private data release
mechanisms that are tailored to specific machine learning
algorithms (Upadhyay, 2014; Blocki et al., 2012; Sheffet,
2015b). But this approach limits the ability of the analyst to
compare different machine learning algorithms on a given
dataset. For instance, if an analyst wants to perform clus-
tering in order to better understand the data before classi-
fication, the covariance matrix or other similar aggregate
statistics may not suffice. Similarly, an analyst may wish
to compare a neural network, linear regression, and a ran-
dom forest on a given dataset before deploying a model. It
is therefore important to design a mechanism that privately
releases data in a form that it can be used by a wide variety
of machine learning algorithms while preserving utility.
In this paper, we tackle this problem of preserving util-
ity for a broad class of machine learning algorithms while
also making reconstruction of the original data impossible.
We do so by using the JL transform in conjunction with
the Laplace mechanism. The JL transform is a powerful
dimensionality reduction tool that preserves pairwise dis-
tances between points (Dasgupta & Gupta, 2003) and has
also been shown to provide differential privacy guarantees
by itself (Blocki et al., 2012). We do not rely on the dif-
ferential privacy guarantees of the JL transform but utilize
the fact that it makes it impossible to reconstruct the exact
original values (or the original dimensionality) of the data
(Liu et al., 2006). We do not use the differential privacy
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properties of the JL transform because in order to achieve
differential privacy via the JL transform by itself, certain
constraints must be imposed on the the rank and the spec-
trum of the data matrix. More specifically, the data matrix
is required to be full rank and the smallest eigenvalue of
the data matrix must be larger than a given threshold. For
data matrices that do not meet the required constraints, the
mechanism in (Blocki et al., 2012) modifies the spectrum
of the matrix via an operation that greatly compromises
utility. This leaves open the problem of utilizing the abil-
ity of the JL transform to make reconstruction impossible
while providing differential privacy via a mechanism that
preserves utility.
We make progress in this direction by combining the power
of the JL transform and the Laplace mechanism in a man-
ner that preserves utility while also providing differential
privacy guarantees such that the original data cannot be re-
constructed. Our approach is similar to (Kenthapadi et al.,
2012) and can be considered as an extension to their work.
Our data release mechanism provides utility for general ma-
chine learning tasks and is differentially private under sin-
gle element changes as well as row changes. We prove
the differential privacy guarantees provided by our mecha-
nism and also propose an algorithm that maintains pairwise
distances between private data points in expectation. We
chose the most general task of clustering in order to show
the effectiveness of our methods experimentally.
Our contributions in this paper are:
• We propose a differentially private data release mech-
anism that preserves privacy and makes it impossible
for an adversary to reconstruct the original data.
• We propose a distance recovery algorithm and prove
that it maintains pairwise distances in expectation. We
also prove precise variance guarantees for the distance
recovery algorithm.
• We experimentally validate the utility of our mecha-
nism by showing that it maintains pairwise distances
and performs well on the general task of clustering
The paper is organized as follows: we first provide the re-
quired background on differential privacy in Section 2. We
describe our mechanism in Section 3 and prove its differ-
ential privacy guarantees. We provide utility guarantees in
Section 4 and experimentally validate our claims in Section
5, showing the effectiveness of our mechanism. Related
work is covered in Section 6, followed by the Conclusion
in Section 7.
2. Background
In this section we define differential privacy and also cover
other necessary mathematical background required for our
results.
2.1. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy captures precisely how likely is it for a
third-party to ascertain whether an individual participated
in a database or not. In order to formalize the definition
of differential privacy, we first introduce the notion of
neighboring databases.
Definition 1 (Neighboring databases). Given an input
space X ⊆ Rd, we can represent a database with n en-
tries, X ∈ Xn as X ∈ Rn×d. Then, two databases
X1, X2 ∈ Rn×d are row-wise neighbors if they differ in
exactly one row. They are considered element-wise neigh-
bors, if they differ in exactly one element.
Definition 2 (Probability Simplex). Given a set Y , the
probability simplex over Y is defined as : ∆Y ={
y ∈ R|Y| : yi ≥ 0,
∑|Y|
i=1 yi = 1
}
Definition 3 (Randomization Mechanism). Given two sets
X ,Y , a randomization mechanism is a functionM : X →
∆Y .
Thus, a randomization mechanism defines a probability
distribution over the set Y . Given an input x ∈ X , a
randomization mechanism M, maps x to y ∈ Y with
probability (M(x))y , which is the probability for element
y under the distribution (M(x)).
Definition 4 (Privacy Loss). For a randomization
mechanism M, the privacy loss for two neighboring
databases X1, X2, is defined as: LDM(X1)||M(X2) =
ln
(
P[M(X1)⊆D]−δ
P[M(X2)⊆D]
)
Definition 5 (Differential Privacy). For any ǫ > 0, and
δ ∈ [0, 1), a randomizationmechanismM is (ǫ, δ) differen-
tially private on domainX if for two neighboring databases
X1, X2, the privacy loss
∣∣∣LDM(X1)||M(X2)
∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ.
For a more thorough review of (ǫ, δ) privacy, the reader is
referred to (Dwork et al., 2014).
2.2. Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma
The Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma states that a set of
points in a high-dimensional space can be embedded into a
lower dimensional space such that the distances between
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the projected points are preserved with high probability.
We provide a statement of this lemma that relies on a pro-
jection matrix using values from the Gaussian distribution.
Consider a finite set S ⊂ Rd with |S| = n. Let P ∈ Rd×k
be a real valued matrix such that Pij ∼ N (0, 1k ), where
k = Ω(Λ−2log(n)) for 0 < Λ ≤ 1. Then for any x, y ∈ S,
we have:
(1 − Λ)||x− y||22 ≤ ||xP − yP ||22 ≤ (1 + Λ)||x− y||22
Further,E
[||xP − yP ||22] = ||x−y||22. This result is called
the Johnson-Lindenstrauss (JL) lemma. We refer the reader
to (Dasgupta & Gupta, 2003) for a proof of the lemma.
3. Privacy Guarantees
Our randomization mechanism utilizes the JL transform to
reduce the dimensionality of the input and then uses the
Laplacian mechanism to provide differential privacy guar-
antees. Since the elements of the JL matrix are normally
distributed, we utilize their properties in conjunction with
the Laplace mechanism to provide differential privacy guar-
antees while still maintaining utility. We do not rely on
the differential privacy properties of the JL transform itself
(Blocki et al., 2012) because it requires a transformation of
the data matrix that does not preserve any utility in certain
practical cases (see Section 6 for details).
Instead our mechanism design follows that of
(Kenthapadi et al., 2012) with two key differences: a)
our mechanism adds noise from the Laplace distribution
(whereas (Kenthapadi et al., 2012) added noise from a
Gaussian distribution) b) our mechanism provides privacy
guarantees with respect to element and row-wise changes
(whereas (Kenthapadi et al., 2012) only provide guarantees
with respect to element wise changes). The JL transform
not only reduces dimensionality of the input, but also
provides further security from attackers by making it
impossible to reconstruct the original data values if the JL
transformation matrix is kept secret (Liu et al., 2006). We
now describe our randomization mechanism.
3.1. Randomization Mechanism
Given database X ∈ Rn×d, our mechanism first projects
the data onto a lower dimensional subspace Rk, with
k << d, and then adds a noise matrix ∆ ∈ Rn×k to
the projected data. The entries of this noise matrix are
drawn i.i.d from a Laplacian distribution. The mechanism
requires the projection parameter k which determines the
dimensionality of the subspace that we wish to project the
data into. In addition, it requires the privacy parameters
c and ǫ in order to determine the scale of the Laplacian
distribution, where ǫ is determined by the level of privacy
we wish to maintain and c is a parameter that will become
clear in the proofs of privacy guarantees. Algorithm 1.
outlines our mechanism.
Algorithm 1: Randomization Mechanism
Input :X ∈ Rn×d, k, c, ǫ
Output : Z ∈ Rn×k
1. Construct JL projection matrix P ∈ Rd×k such that
Pij ∼ N (0, 1k )
2. Set Y = XP
3. Construct noise matrix∆ ∈ Rn×k such that
∆ij ∼ Laplacian(0, cǫ ).
4. Return Z = Y +∆
Note that we do not release the projection matrix P , in or-
der to eliminate the possibility of a reconstruction attack
(Dwork & Yekhanin, 2008).
3.2. Privacy Guarantees
Lemma 1. For any X,X ′ ∈ Rn×d, such that X and X ′
differ in exactly one element with ||X−X ′||1 ≤ 1, we have
for any A ∈ Rd×k, ||XA − X ′A||1 ≤
√
k max
1≤i≤d
||Ai||2,
where Ai is the ith row of A.
Proof. We prove the above by direct calculation.
||XA−X ′A||1 = ||(X −X ′)A||1
≤ max
1≤i≤d
k∑
j=1
|Aij |
= max
1≤i≤d
||Ai||1
≤
√
k max
1≤i≤d
||Ai||2
where the second inequality follows from the fact that
(X −X ′) only contains one non-zero element and the last
inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for
inner product spaces.
Lemma 2. (Kenthapadi et al., 2012) Let
P ∈ Rd×k such that Pij ∼ N (0, 1k ), then
Pr
[
max
1≤i≤d
||Pi||2 > 1 +
√
2x
k
]
< de−x, for any x > 0.
Theorem 3. For any two element-wise neighboring
databasesX,X ′ ∈ Rn×d, such that ||X−X ′||1 ≤ 1, Algo-
rithm 1. achieves ǫ-differential privacy with probability at
least 1−de−k2 , with respect to changes in a single element.
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Proof. Using Lemma 1 we have, ||XP − X ′P ||1 ≤√
k max
1≤i≤d
||Pi||2. Let, Y = XP and Y ′ = X ′P and with-
out loss of generality, consider Y, Y ′,∆ ∈ Rnk. Now, set
Z = Y +∆, Z ′ = Y ′ +∆, and let D ⊂ Rnk. Due to the
i.i.d assumption on the elements of∆ we have:
Pr[Z ∈ D] = 1
(2b)nk
∫
D
e−
1
b
(||z−Y ||1)dz
≥ 1
(2b)nk
∫
D
e−
1
b
(||z−Y ′||1+||Y
′−Y ||1)dz
=
1
(2b)nk
∫
D
e−
1
b
(||z−Y ′||1)e−
1
b
(||Y ′−Y ||1)dz
= e−
1
b
(||Y ′−Y ||1)P [Z ′ ∈ D]
=⇒ Pr[Z ′ ∈ D] ≤ e 1b (||Y ′−Y ||1)Pr[Z ∈ D]
We set ǫ = c
b
in Algorithm 1, therefore, in order to preserve
privacy, we must constrain
||Y−Y ′||1
b
< c
b
.
Pr
[ ||Y − Y ′||1
b
>
c
b
]
= Pr[||Y − Y ′||1 > c]
≤ Pr
[
max
1≤i≤d
||Pi||2 > c√
k
]
Setting c = 2
√
k, and x in Lemma 2 to k2 , we get:
Pr
[
max
1≤i≤d
||Pi||2 > 2
]
≤ de− k2
Hence, Algorithm 1. achieves ǫ-differential privacy with
probability at least 1− de−k2 .
Thus, Theorem 3 provides privacy guarantees and
also utilizes the dimensionality reduction properties of
the JL transform. It is similar to the work done by
(Kenthapadi et al., 2012) in which the authors define a
random mechanism that first does a JL transform and then
adds Gaussian noise. Since the above result is limited to
providing privacy guarantees for element-wise changes,
we now focus on extending it to row-wise changes. That
is, we now show that Algorithm 1. provides differential
privacy when two databases differ by one row.
Lemma 4. If P ∈ Rd×k with Pij ∼ N (0, 1k ), and v ∈ Rd
then Pr
[
k max
1≤i≤k
∣∣∣∑dj=1 vjPji
∣∣∣ > kt
]
≤ 2ke
−kt2
2||v||2
2 .
Proof. First note that,
∑d
j=1 vjPji ∼ N (0, ||v||
2
2
k
). There-
fore, it is Gaussian and hence Sub-Gaussian, which lets us
use tail bounds for Sub-Gaussian random variables and get:
Pr
[∣∣∣∑dj=1 vjPji
∣∣∣ > t] ≤ 2e −kt
2
2||v||2
2 . Using the union
bound and multiplying both sides by k, we get the desired
result.
We now show that our mechanism provides differential pri-
vacy guarantees with respect to row changes in the data
matrix.
Theorem 5. For any two row-wise neighboring databases
X,X ′ ∈ Rn×d, that differ in row m, such that ||Xm −
X ′m||22 ≤ α, Algorithm 1. achieves ǫ-differential privacy
with probability at least 1− 2ke−kt22α , where t ≥
√
2ln 2k
k
α.
Proof. Suppose thatX,X ′ differ in rowm, then we have:
||XP −X ′P ||1 =
k∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
j=1
Pji(Xmj −X ′mj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ k max
1≤i≤k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
j=1
Pji(Xmj −X ′mj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Next, we can see that
∑d
j=1 Pji(Xmj − X ′mj) ∼
N (0, ||Xm−X′m||22
k
). Hence, we can use Lemma 4 to get:
Pr

k max
1≤i≤k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
j=1
Pji(Xmj −X ′mj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > kt


≤ 2ke
−kt2
2||Xm−X′m||
2
2
Setting c = kt, and t ≥
√
2ln 2k
k
α we ensure that
2ke
−kt2
2||Xm−X′m||
2
2 ∈ [0, 1]. Once again letting Y = XP
and Y ′ = X ′P and without loss of generality, letting
Y, Y ′,∆ ∈ Rnk, we set Z = Y + ∆, Z ′ = Y ′ + ∆, and
let D ⊂ Rnk. By following the same steps as we did in
Theorem 3. we get:
Pr [Z ′ ∈ D] ≤ e 1b (||Y ′−Y ||1)Pr [Z ∈ D]
Now, we constrain
||Y−Y ′||1
b
< c
b
.
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Pr
[ ||Y − Y ′||1
b
>
c
b
]
= Pr [||Y − Y ′||1 > c]
= Pr [||(X −X ′)P ||1 > c]
≤ Pr

k max
1≤i≤k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
j=1
Pji(Xmj −X ′mj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > c


≤ 2ke
−kt2
2||Xm−X′m||
2
2
≤ 2ke−kt
2
2α
Hence, Algorithm 1. achieves ǫ-differential privacy with
probability at least 1− 2ke−kt
2
2α .
4. Utility Guarantees
A differentially private mechanism that is also an isomet-
ric isomorphism would allow any machine learning algo-
rithm to extract the same amount of utility from the pri-
vate data as it could from the non-private data. Drawing
from that intuition, we also measure utility as was proposed
in (Kenthapadi et al., 2012), by the degree to which a pri-
vacy mechanism preserves pairwise distances after its ac-
tion. That is, a mechanism that allows pairwise distances
to be preserved in the private representation of the data is
more useful than one that does not. In order to capture this
notion, we first define a distance recovery algorithm in Al-
gorithm 2 that takes as input, two private data points and
outputs the distance between them. We then show that the
algorithm preserves squared distances in expectation. Fur-
ther, we show that the variance of the squared distance be-
tween any two points is proportional to the dimensionality
of the subspace that the mechanism projects the data into.
Algorithm 2: Recover Distance
Input :Z ∈ Rn×k, σ2, (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , n}
Output :Distance between Zi and Zj
1. OutputD(Zi, Zj) = ||Zi − Zj||22 − 2kσ2
4.1. Guarantees
Claim 6. Let S ⊂ Rd with |S| = n. Then, given any
two entries in this set xi, xj ∈ S, let yi = xiP + ∆i and
yj = xjP + ∆j , where P and ∆i,∆j are the projection
matrix and the noise vectors respectively. Let, D(·, ·) be
defined as in Algorithm 2. Then, D(yi, yj) is an unbiased
estimator of ||xi − xj ||22.
Proof. Let ∆ = ∆i − ∆j , and let σ2 be the variance of
the entries of the projection matrices∆i and ∆j . Then we
have:
E [D(yi, yj)] = E
[||xiP +∆i − xjP −∆j ||22 − 2kσ2]
= E
[||(xi − xj)P +∆||22 − 2kσ2]
= E
[||(xi − xj)P ||22 + ||∆||22 + 2〈(xi − xj)P,∆〉 − 2kσ2]
= E[||(xi − xj)P ||22] + E[||∆||22]+
2E[〈(xi − xj)P,∆〉]− 2kσ2
= E[||(xi − xj)P ||22] + E[
k∑
t=1
(∆it −∆jt)2]+
2E[〈(xi − xj)P,∆〉]− 2kσ2
= E[||(xi − xj)P ||22] + E[
k∑
t=1
(∆it)
2 + (∆jt)
2 − 2∆it∆jt ]+
2E[〈(xi − xj)P,∆〉]− 2kσ2
= E[||(xi − xj)P ||22] +
k∑
t=1
4b2 + 2E[〈(xi − xj)P,∆〉]− 2kσ2
= ||xi − xj ||22 + 4kb2 + 0− 2kσ2
= ||xi − xj ||22 + 4kb2 + 0− 2k(2b2)
= ||xi − xj ||22
Note that by the Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma, we have
E[||(xi − xj)P ||22] = ||xi − xj ||22. We now show that
2E[〈(xi − xj)P,∆〉] = 0,
Letting a = (xi − xj), we have
2E[〈(xi − xj)P,∆〉] = 2E[〈aP,∆〉]
= 2
k∑
t=1
E[(aP )t]E[∆t]
= 2
k∑
t=1
E[(
d∑
m=1
amPmt)]E[∆t]
= 2
k∑
t=1
(
d∑
m=1
amE[Pmt])E[∆t]
= 0
where we have used the independence of P and∆.
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Claim 7. Let S ⊂ Rd with |S| = n. Then, given any two
entries in this set xi, xj ∈ S, let yi = xiP +∆i and yj =
xjP + ∆j , where P and ∆i,∆j are the projection matrix
and the noise vectors respectively. Then the variance of
D(yi, yj) = 2k ||xi−xj ||42+2k(7σ4−σ2)+4σ2||xi−xj ||22,
where σ2 is the variance of the entries of∆i and∆j .
Proof. Let,
Z1 = ||(xi − xj)P ||22
Z2 = ||∆||22
Z3 = 2〈(xi − xj)P,∆〉
Then, Var(||xiP + ∆i − xjP − ∆j ||22 − 2kσ2) =
Var(Z1 + Z2 + Z3)− 2kσ2. Then,
Var(Z1 + Z2 + Z3) = E[(Z1 + Z2 + Z3)
2]
− (E[Z1 + Z2 + Z3])2
= E[Z21 ]− E[Z1]2 + E[Z22 ]−
E[Z2]
2 + E[Z23 ]− E[Z3]2+
2E[Z1Z2]− 2E[Z1]E[Z2]+
2E[Z2Z3]− 2E[Z2]E[Z3]
+ 2E[Z1Z3]− 2E[Z1]E[Z3]
=
2
k
||xi − xj ||42 + 14kσ4+
4σ2||xi − xj ||22
(1)
where we have used the following :
E[Z21 ]− E[Z1]2 =
2
k
||xi − xj ||42
E[Z22 ]− E[Z2]2 = 14kσ4
E[Z23 ]− E[Z3]2 = 4σ2||xi − xj ||22
Using independence of Z1 and Z2 we have 2E[Z1Z2] =
2E[Z1]E[Z2]. For the rest of the variables we have
2E[Z2Z3] = 2E[Z2]E[Z3] = 2E[Z1Z3] = 2E[Z1]E[Z3] =
0. Using these, the required result follows.
We can consider the probability of the distance recovery
algorithm exceeding a fixed error λ. More specifically,
letting xi, xj be two points in the original space and
letting yi, yj be the points after the action of the mech-
anism, we want to know how this value is bounded :
Pr
[∣∣D(yi, yj)− ||xi − xj ||22∣∣ > λ]. Using the Cheby-
chev inequality, we get:
Pr [|D(yi, yj)− E[D(yi, yj)]| > λ] ≤ V ar(D(yi, yj))
λ2
∴ Pr
[∣∣D(yi, yj)− ||xi − xj ||22∣∣ > λ] ≤ V ar(D(yi, yj))λ2
Therefore, we see that the probability the distance recovery
algorithm exceeds a fixed error is proportional to the dis-
tance between the original points and the dimensionality of
the subspace we project the data into.
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Figure 1. Scatter plot of the original 3D dataset with colors sepa-
rating the two clusters
5. Experiments
All of our experiments are based on a synthetic dataset
comprising of two clusters generated through the procedure
developed by Guyon (2003), which is commonly referred
to as the Madelon dataset. In this data generation proce-
dure, the data points for each cluster are sampled from an
isotropic Gaussian distribution. We fix the Euclidean dis-
tance between the cluster centers to 4 and use an ǫ of 4 for
all our experiments. We also assume that for two neighbor-
ing databases (element-wise or row-wise), the norm of their
difference is bounded by 1. That is, for two neighboring
databases X,X ′ ∈ Rn×d, we have ||X − X ′||1 ≤ 1. We
use the open source implementation of this data generation
procedure provided in Scikit as sklearn.datasets.make blob
(Pedregosa et al. (2011)).
Since this dataset is decoupled from any specific problem
domain and is a two class clustering problem, it allows us
to demonstrate the utility of our mechanismwith maximum
generality. In order to better understand the generated data
in higher dimensions, we first generate data in R3 and pro-
vide its visualization in Figure 1. Next, we illustrate the ef-
fect of the element-wise and row-wise privacy mechanisms
defined in Algorithm 1, by visualizing the data using k = 2
(i.e. projecting it into R2 and making it private) in Figure
2.
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Figure 2. Scatter plots of the 2D dataset for the Element-wise pri-
vacy mechanism and the Row-wise privacy mechanism with col-
ors separating the two clusters. Each privacy mechanism turns the
spherical data into ellipses that are stretched along the directions
of the noise while still maintaining separation.
Using the same dataset defined above, we verify the util-
ity guarantees of our distance recovery algorithm (Algo-
rithm 2). In order to do so, we first sample 1000 pairs of
points from the original dataset and calculate the squared
Euclidean distance between each pair. This gives us a to-
tal of 1000 distances. We then run each pair through our
privacy mechanism 1000 times using a new projection and
perturbation vector each time (giving us 1 million private
pairs). We then use our distance recovery algorithm ( Al-
gorithm 2 ) to calculate the squared Euclidean distance be-
tween each private pair of points, giving us 1 million dis-
tances for the private data points (1000 distances for each
private pair). Next, we plot the distribution of differences
in the squared Euclidean distance between the original pair
and the private pairs in Figure 3. One can see that the dis-
tance recovery algorithm does indeed recover the squared
Euclidean distances in expectation. For one run of the ex-
periment, the mean of the differences for element-wise pri-
vate pairs and row-wise private pairs from the original pairs
was found to be 0.006 and −0.011 respectively.
In order to test the utility of our method on the task of clus-
tering, we compare the performance of the k-means clus-
tering algorithm on the original data, element-wise private
data, and the row-wise private data. We ran this compari-
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Figure 3. Distribution of the difference between the original
squared Euclidean distances and the squared Euclidean distances
recovered by our distance recovery algorithm.
son for a number of datasets in which we varied both the
original and projected dimensions. The results of this ex-
periments are provided in Table 1. We note that the mecha-
nism provides good utility for smaller k but the utility dete-
riorates as we increase the dimensionality of the projected
subspace, a result that is expected due to the reliance of
Laplacian noise on the projection subspace parameter k as
shown in Theorems 3, and 5.
We examine the relationship in more detail by plotting the
relationship between k and the standard deviation of the
data in Figure 4. The formula used for this is
√
1 + 2b2,
where 1 is the variance of the original data and 2b2 is the
variance of the Laplacian noise. It can be noted that the
standard deviation increases with k hence negatively af-
fecting the amount of utility provided by the mechanism.
We also note a difference in the standard deviation be-
tween element-wise and row-wise privacy mechanisms -
row-wise privacy comes at a higher cost utility cost than
element-wise privacy.
Our experiments validate the ability of the distance recov-
ery algorithm (Algorithm 2) to recover the squared Eu-
clidean distances between original points and also show
that our privacy mechanisms are able to maintain utility
in the general task of clustering. We find that the utility
of our mechanism deteriorates with an increase in the di-
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Privacy Mechanism d=3, k=2 d=10, k=3 d=50, k=10 d=100, k=20
None 0.9783 0.9772 0.9771 0.9797
Element-Wise 0.9441 0.9082 0.6954 0.6927
Row-Wise 0.9477 0.909 0.6796 0.6668
Table 1. Comparison of performance of k-means clustering between the non-private, element-wise private, and row-wise private data.
Here d is the original dimension of the data and k is the projected dimension.
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Figure 4. Increase in standard deviation with k
mensionality of the projection subspace which agrees with
Theorems 3, and 5.
6. Related Work
Differential privacy is a framework proposed by
(Dwork et al., 2006) that captures precisely how much
additional information of an individual is leaked by par-
ticipating in a database, that would not have been leaked
otherwise. There has been extensive research in proposing
mechanisms that guarantee differential privacy in the non-
interactive setting (Alda & Rubinstein, 2017; Balog et al.,
2017; McSherry & Talwar, 2007; Dwork et al., 2014).
(Kenthapadi et al., 2012) developed a randomization mech-
anism that utilized the JL transform and the Gaussian mech-
anism (Dwork et al., 2014) to provide non-interactive dif-
ferential privacy with respect to attribute changes. They
showed that their mechanism preserved utility by preserv-
ing distances in expectation. However, a shortcoming of
this approach was that the privacy guarantees were only
provided with respect to attribute changes, and not row
level changes, which is a more realistic requirement in prac-
tice. Despite that shortcoming, the mechanism was power-
ful from a privacy perspective, as it had been shown by
(Liu et al., 2006) that random projection-based multiplica-
tive perturbation techniques make it impossible to find the
exact values of the original data in addition to simply hid-
ing the dimensionality of the data. Further, they showed
that if even if the projection matrix is released, the adver-
sary still cannot find the exact value of any elements from
the original data.
(Blocki et al., 2012) showed that the JL transform itself pre-
served differential privacy and provided utility guarantees
in the strict case when only the covariance matrix is re-
leased. However, in order to provide privacy guarantees,
the data matrix was required to be full rank with eigenval-
ues above some threshold. Since this is not always feasible
in practice, they provided a work around which perturbed
all the singular values of the data matrix. In practice, this
magnitude of this perturbation can be orders of magnitude
larger than the attribute values, hence causing general ma-
chine learning algorithms to have extremely poor perfor-
mance. Along similar lines of using multiplicative random
projections to preserve privacy for special problems is the
work of (Zhou et al., 2009) who showed that multiplicative
random projection methods preserved utility in the case of
doing PCA.
Releasing differentially private data raises some funda-
mental questions about the ability of machine learn-
ing algorithms to extract utility from the private data.
(Kasiviswanathan et al., 2011) showed that in the PAC
learning model with a discrete domain, any finite hypoth-
esis class that is PAC learning is also privately PAC learn-
able. These results were extended to half space queries by
(Blum et al., 2013) and the sample complexities of proper
and improper learners were analyzed by (Beimel et al.,
2010). However, (Chaudhuri & Hsu, 2011) showed that
there exist simple hypothesis classes over continuous do-
mains that have a small VC dimension and for whom
it is impossible learn privately with a finite sample size.
(Friedman & Schuster, 2010) analyzed the trade-off be-
tween privacy, sample complexity, and utility in practice
for the case of decision trees.
Another line of research focused on releasing dif-
ferentially private models with respect to the data
(Chaudhuri & Monteleoni, 2009; Evfimievski et al., 2004;
Sheffet, 2015a; Zhu et al., 2017). (Chaudhuri et al., 2011)
developed a mechanism for private empirical risk mini-
mization that provided private approximates to classifiers
and along similar lines (Bassily et al., 2014) analyzed er-
ror bounds on such classifiers. Releasing private mod-
els also raised questions between the trade-off of pri-
vacy and algorithmic complexity, which was analyzed by
(Friedman & Schuster, 2010) in practice for the case of de-
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cision trees.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
We developed a privacy mechanism that makes it impossi-
ble to reconstruct the original data values while also provid-
ing utility for general machine learning tasks. We proved
privacy guarantees under element and row wise changes,
and also proved utility guarantees by proposing an algo-
rithm that maintains pairwise distances between private
data points in expectation. We chose the most general task
of clustering in order to show the effectiveness of our meth-
ods experimentally and validated that it does in fact main-
tain utility. Noting that the utility of our mechanism deteri-
orates with an increase in the dimensionality of the projec-
tion subspace, we leave open the question of finding a pri-
vate mechanism that makes reconstruction impossible and
provides utility that does not deteriorate with the dimen-
sionality of the problem.
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